This IA accompanies three proposals designed to support the establishment of the savings and investment union, as well as the EU's efforts to deepen capital market integration, strengthen supervision and foster innovation. Overall, the IA is meaningful, but could have been shorter, in line with the Better Regulation Guidelines. The IA identifies three problems and two drivers. While the consequences are well-defined across the different stakeholder groups, the scale and scope of the problem remain difficult to assess due to the limited quantification provided. The principles of subsidiarity and proportionality are respected. The IA defines one general objective, which it breaks down into three specific objectives, but does not provide operational objectives. The European Commission has presented two policy packages: one for reducing barriers to cross-border operations and innovation and another for addressing supervisory divergence. Each package includes two policy options. These options are based on previous research and stakeholder consultation; however, the choice of options is quite limited, even though the IA specifies which options were discarded at an early stage and why. The IA only assesses the economic impact of the proposed legislation, omitting impacts on citizens. It would have been relevant to include a wider range of impacts such as territorial or digital effects. Additionally, the costs and benefits are mainly discussed qualitatively. The IA includes an SME test and a competitiveness check. The Commission consulted a broad range of stakeholders and included their views in the IA. In addition, the IA uses robust data sources, provides a clear monitoring plan and is transparent about its limitations. The IA openly knowledges that it did not address all the Regulatory Scrutiny Board's comments, due to time and data constraints. Finally, the legislative proposals are aligned with the IA. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

European political parties ('europarties') emerged in the 1970s, preceding the first direct elections to the European Parliament in 1979. The Maastricht Treaty of 1992 granted them legal recognition; however, it was only in 2004 that EU law defined their status, set establishment criteria, and provided independent funding. The most recent regulatory change in 2025 emphasised protecting EU values, strengthening safeguards against foreign interference, and updating transparency and financing requirements. Europarties' influence depends on balancing European and national interests. Ongoing deliberations seek to enhance europarties' resilience, and their independence from national politics, reflecting the broader debate on the balance of power between Member States and EU institutions. This search for equilibrium continues to drive significant academic and political discussion. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

The purpose of this study is to enhance the evidence base on how organised crime groups (OCGs) have evolved into transnational geopolitical actors, to evaluate the suitability of international legal frameworks for holding them accountable, and to offer policy recommendations to strengthen this accountability. The study finds that international law fails to adequately define or reflect the transformation of OCGs into geopolitical actors. Instead, it relies on outdated conceptions of criminal hierarchies, which confine organised crime to the transnational rather than international legal domain . International law is therefore restricted in its ability to categorise these groups as legal entities, even where their actions resemble crimes against humanity in their intent and scale . This definitional oversight has practical consequences: EU external action efforts generate relatively little information on geopolitical threats tied to OCGs, and the international criminal, humanitarian, and human rights infrastructure is unable to directly confront the actions of these groups. The study calls for the redefinition of OCGs as part of a new Directive, as well as practical measures to refine criminal justice mechanisms, improve cross-border cooperation, update EU external action threat assessments and support existing international legal frameworks to more effectively account for the geopolitical behaviours and impacts of OCGs. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Against the backdrop of a rising U.S. federal deficit and increasing geoeconomic tensions, understanding who holds U.S. debt instruments could have important policy implications, including for the EU. This briefing provides an overview of the size and ownership structure of U.S. public debt and assesses the extent of Europe’s exposure. It further considers whether such exposure could translate into potential political leverage. The first part of the briefing outlines recent developments in the evolution of U.S. public debt, including its size, trajectory, and changing composition. The second part analyses EU Member States’ exposure to U.S. Treasury instruments. It further discusses the implications and limits of potential political leverage arising from Europe’s significant holdings of U.S. assets, highlighting the dominant role of private investors and the constraints on coordinated policy action. Finally, it considers how a possible gradual portfolio adjustment, including a gradual reduced accumulation of U.S. assets, and stronger home bias, could shape future financial flows, and how initiatives such as the Savings and Investment Union (SIU) may support a greater reallocation of European savings toward euro-denominated assets. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

This study examines the WTO’s economic and legal value for the European Union and draws policy implications for the European Parliament ahead of MC14. Economically, it shows how MFN non‑discrimination and bound tariffs reduce transaction costs and uncertainty for EU exporters – especially SMEs – and warns that a two‑tier system of bilateral ‘deals’ would fragment markets and penalise EU high‑value trade. It reviews recent quantitative evidence on the welfare and export gains from GATT/WTO Membership and assesses early findings on the Trade Facilitation Agreement, noting that trade‑cost reductions abroad can benefit EU firms via supply chains. Legally, it maps how WTO disciplines shape EU legislation and how EU FTAs both embed WTO rules (‘WTO‑plus‘) and pioneer ‘extra‑WTO‘ and sustainability provisions. It also tests the available policy space to design ‘buy European‘ procurement measures consistently with WTO/GPA commitments. On reform, the study analyses pragmatic pathways for integrating new plurilaterals, improving disciplines on State interventions (including transparency), addressing non‑market practices (subsidies and public bodies), refining Special and differential treatment (SDT), and restoring a functioning dispute settlement system. Key recommendations urge Parliament to champion WTO stability, support integration of plurilaterals, help broaden participation in the Multi-Party Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement (MPIA), and ensure credible use of EU enforcement tools against ‘appeal into the void‘ tactics. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Erasmus for All is a pilot initiative implemented by the European University Foundation in cooperation with participating higher education institutions and funded under the Erasmus+ programme. The initiative explored whether city-based top-ups to Erasmus+ student mobility grants could improve affordability in high-cost destinations. The pilot’s outcomes indicate that additional support can reduce perceived financial pressure during mobility in higher-cost cities. However, it does not address the main barriers to equal access to mobility, notably upfront costs, liquidity constraints and institutional and administrative pressures. There is no evidence that the approach influences students’ destination choices or the overall distribution of mobility. As the pilot allocates resources based on destination characteristics and adds administrative complexity without means to process these, it should be seen as an affordability adjustment rather than a solution to unequal participation. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

The Strategic Compass, adopted by the 27 EU Member States in March 2022 – only weeks after the onset of Russia's unjustified and unprovoked aggression against Ukraine – emphasised the need for robust partnerships in order for the EU to be able to achieve its objectives in the area of security and defence. Alongside 'acting' (operations), 'securing' (resilience) and 'investing', 'partnering' is one of the four main pillars of the Compass. The document itself outlines specific targets and deadlines against which to measure progress in this area. While the EU has partnered with other security and defence actors (essentially states and international organisations) in the past, a new model of tailored security and defence partnership was launched shortly after the Compass was adopted, as a framework for enhanced partnership. To date, the EU has signed nine such partnerships – with (by date of signature) Moldova, Norway, Japan, South Korea, North Macedonia, Albania, the United Kingdom, Canada and India – and more are envisaged. While the partnerships vary in content, depending on the assessed mutual interests of the EU and each individual partner, around 10 areas of cooperation are common to all nine. The European Parliament has highlighted the significance of the Strategic Compass's partnership dimension and, in particular, the value of security and defence dialogues with partners from the Western Balkans and the Eastern Partnership, as well as with key partners in strategic maritime areas such as the Southern Neighbourhood and the Indo-Pacific. Parliament has also underlined that cooperation with countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Norway, Ukraine, Georgia, Western Balkan countries, Japan, Australia and certain African countries serves as a key element of the common security and defence policy. In 2023, it called for deeper military and defence cooperation with Japan and South Korea, and for closer cooperation with partners in Latin America and the Caribbean. This briefing updates an earlier one from January 2025, drafted by Elena Lazarou with Panagiotis Politis Lamprou. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

The world has changed since the European Union adopted its first economic security strategy in 2023. An increasingly confrontational geopolitical environment and the possibility of coercive behaviour from both China and the United States require a longer term strategy to reduce dependencies as well as a short-term ability to react swiftly to threats. On 3 December 2025, the European Commission adopted its new communication on economic security aiming to switch up a gear, from finding ad-hoc responses to crises based on risk identification, to proactive risk anticipation and mitigation. This new approach also focuses on providing clarity on the strategic and coherent use of the many instruments already available in the EU toolbox. Aiming for a safer and more resilient EU economy, the Commission's communication proposes ways to protect and develop strategic industries and reduce the EU's vulnerabilities to coercion and other disruption. To build a solid knowledge base for informed decision-making and common understanding of risks and responses, the approach seeks to strengthen data gathering, analysis and overall economic security policy governance, with increased public and private stakeholder participation. To boost coherence, the Commission wants to adapt existing policy tools to deployment with a clear aim of managing economic security risks, taking possible impacts across policies into account. The Commission will seek to close existing security gaps with new instruments, such as the revised Blocking Statute. The communication met with mixed reactions from the expert community, with both praise for taking the much needed step in the right direction, as well as criticism for its insufficient response to the stark challenges facing the EU. The European Parliament is preparing its opinion on the role of trade in strengthening the EU's economic security, to be adopted in the coming months. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

The European Union's competitiveness and prosperity depends on an optimal allocation of private capital; however, although free circulation of capital is guaranteed by the Treaties, the EU's capital markets remain fragmented due to 'technical barriers' and legal uncertainties falling on cross-border investors and institutions. A major reason for that is that EU rules are mostly set out through directives, leaving Member States' supervisory authorities latitude in their interpretation and application of the rules. Therefore, the European Commission considers the use of regulations instead of directives, as well as the establishment of EU-level single supervision, as two policy instruments to 'integrate' – i.e. 'defragment' – the EU's capital markets. On 4 December 2025, the Commission issued a package of three proposals to address this situation (the 'market integration package'), as part of its savings and investments union strategy. One of the three proposals would be a regulation on the settlement finality, thereby converting and replacing the existing directive. The directive establishes the finality and irrevocability of transfer orders once entered, even in the event of a participant's insolvency, with the aim of reducing stability risks in the payment and settlement systems. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Cyberattacks are rising in frequency and complexity, and no sector is immune to malicious intrusions. Cybercriminals are increasingly leveraging artificial intelligence (AI) to exploit vulnerabilities in digital infrastructure, compromising security systems and inflicting damage. Addressing this growing threat requires a clear understanding of the nature of cyber incidents. The most effective way to develop this understanding is for affected entities and companies to systematically report cyber incidents and in accordance with predefined protocols. These reports help identify and patch vulnerabilities, share security alerts proactively and prevent further attacks. Accordingly, European regulators have incorporated mandatory reporting requirements into legal frameworks to harness the full potential of incident reporting and counter the escalating threat of cyberattacks. These legal provisions have been designed to safeguard critical entities, infrastructure and internet-connected devices. However, the distinct protections created for each category have resulted in separate legal acts, each with its own reporting procedures, notifying authorities and deadlines. This fragmented approach has created significant administrative challenges for companies. To address this complexity, the Digital Omnibus – a legislative initiative that amends several existing EU digital rules to harmonise requirements and reduce the regulatory burden in digital governance – proposes the implementation of a Single-Entry Point (SEP) mechanism. SEP aims to streamline compliance by allowing companies to fulfil multiple mandatory reporting obligations under various EU laws through a unified process. SEP is a cornerstone of the broader Digital Omnibus regulation proposal. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Technologies are evolving rapidly, data traffic is growing significantly, and demand for gigabit connectivity is increasing. Modern and sustainable digital infrastructures for connectivity and computing are critical enablers for digitalisation and for both industrial competitiveness and for society. High-quality, secure and resilient connectivity is needed, everywhere and for everybody in the European Union. The EU has set non-binding 'digital decade' targets to be reached by 2030. These include providing all EU households with access to a fixed gigabit network (with a capacity of 1 Gigabit per second – Gbps) and ensuring that all populated areas are covered by next-generation, high-speed wireless networks with performance at least equivalent to that of 5G. On 21 January 2026, the European Commission published a proposal for a digital networks act. The proposed regulation aims to consolidate sector-specific legislation currently set out, inter alia, in the European Electronic Communications Code (EECC), the Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications (BEREC) Regulation, the Open Internet Regulation, the ePrivacy Directive and the radio spectrum policy programme. By replacing directives with a regulation, the Commission aims to ensure uniform application of telecoms rules across all Member States. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

The Artificial Intelligence (AI) Act adopted in 2024 establishes rules for AI systems and general-purpose AI models placed on the EU's internal market. The enforcement of these rules is shared between EU Member States and the European Commission, resulting in a hybrid enforcement model. The European AI board, the scientific panel of independent experts and the AI advisory forum also assist with and support enforcement. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

An organised police force designed for the safety and protection of the public is something that is familiar throughout Europe. The principles of modern policing, first established almost 200 years ago, continue today but in a vastly different, rapidly changing social environment. Across the EU, police forces have different structures, but the tasks carried out by police officers are by and large the same. The individual officers who make up each police force encounter similar scenarios in their role, ranging from misdemeanours in the streets of their hometown to cross-border crime and international terrorism. However, police officers in modern policing encounter a range of risks while carrying out their duties. They confront both operational and organisational stresses, resulting in burnout as well as health and safety risks, including from the array of equipment they carry. While precise Europe-wide figures are not available, officers do encounter verbal and physical assaults and violence resulting in physical and emotional harm. Some Member States record and publish figures of assaults against police officers, but many do not. In addition, there is no clear definition of what is regarded as an assault; often an assault that does not result in noticeable injury is either not reported or not recorded. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

This study maps EU allocations and instruments supporting natural disaster prevention, preparedness, response and recovery under the 2021–2027 Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) and compares them with the European Commission’s proposals for the 2028–2034 MFF. It highlights key structural and budgetary differences, including changes affecting climate and biodiversity mainstreaming, and identifies limits to comparability. The study provides Members of the European Parliament with a clear analytical basis for scrutiny of the post-2027 EU budget. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

The impact assessment supports the proposed legislative amendments to extend the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) to downstream goods, prevent the circumvention of CBAM obligations, and encourage the decarbonisation of electricity imports. While overall it provides a good evidence-based analysis supporting the proposal, it could have been better structured and presented. One of the main shortcomings is that the downstream study, which provides a lot of supporting data justifying the proposal, is not publicly available. The IA defines the problems clearly, despite the challenge that, due to the nature of the basic act, these identified problems have not yet occurred. The IA openly acknowledges this limitation. Given that the three identified problems are very different, the IA analyses several policy options for each of them. Some options are analysed well; however others could have been better developed and explained. The IA presents the preferred policy combination that appears to be the best in terms of potential outcomes, i.e. reducing global emissions and carbon leakage, minimising the risk of circumvention, lessening administrative burden, and improving the treatment of electricity imports. The IA identifies the initiative's general and specific objectives, which are specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and time-bound, as recommended by the Better Regulation Toolbox 'S.M.A.R.T.' criteria. The assessment of environmental, economic and social impacts is carried out, but it is elaborated unevenly. Stakeholders were widely consulted, clearly divided per problem they were addressing, and their views were considered. It appears that efforts were made to address the Regulatory Scrutiny Board's recommendations, but some shortcomings remain, related to the CBAM anti-avoidance measures. Lastly, it appears that the proposal is in line with the preferred policy option combination as identified in the IA. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

The March meeting is an apparent example of a European Council agenda dictated by external events. The meeting was originally due to focus almost exclusively on competitiveness and follow up on the informal retreat of 12 February 2026 with concrete decisions. However, with Hungary and Slovakia refusing to sign off on the EU loan for Ukraine, as well as the joint US-Israel attack on Iran, the meeting's focus is likely to shift. The main aims will now be to overcome the two-country veto on the Ukraine loan, and to define a common approach to a rapidly evolving situation in the Middle East – notably to prevent escalation, promote a diplomatic path to end the crisis and provide support to partner countries in the region, while addressing the possible impact on global energy security. In that context, the European Council will discuss the Middle East as well as multilateralism with the UN Secretary General, António Guterres. However, despite a probable change of focus, competitiveness will feature prominently in the European Council conclusions and provide a high degree of detail, probably going beyond the EU leaders' role of setting the general priorities. Other topics on the agenda are the next multiannual financial framework (MFF), European security and defence, and migration, which, due to time constraints, are expected to trigger less discussion. Following the European Council meeting, EU leaders will convene for a Euro Summit focusing on the economic situation in the EU, the international role of the euro and the savings and investment union. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

This briefing provides background information for the members of the Special committee on the European Democracy Shield (EUDS) on election infrastructure vulnerabilities to foreign interference and on corresponding countermeasures. The briefing focuses on the criticality of election infrastructure and on safeguarding electoral integrity, also in light of the approach set out in the Commission’s Communication on the European Democracy Shield. Moreover, the paper considers the role of private sector election interference services. The briefing begins with an introduction to the different components of election infrastructure and general information on the conduct of elections. It continues with an overview of the election infrastructure interference threat landscape, taking the findings of the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) into account. It then examines recommendations provided by the European Cooperation Network on Elections to mitigate these threats. Next, the briefing presents a section on critical infrastructure legislation and on the measures outlined in the European Democracy Shield to protect election infrastructure. This briefing has been prepared internally by the European Parliament’s Policy Department for Justice, Civil Liberties and Institutional Affairs at the request of the EUDS Committee Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Joint procurement of defence equipment by the EU has gained renewed strategic importance in response to the recent deteriorating security environment and persistent fragmentation within the European defence market. Although the European Defence Agency set a 35 % collaborative procurement benchmark back in 2007, cooperation among Member States remains limited. The 2022 coordinated annual review on defence reported that only 18 % of defence investment took place collaboratively, far below agreed targets. While total EU defence expenditure reached €381 billion in 2025, increased spending has not translated into commensurate growth in joint acquisition. EU institutions continue to highlight duplication issues, capability gaps and over-reliance on non EU suppliers. To address these shortcomings, the Union has expanded financial and regulatory instruments. EDIRPA, EDIP and SAFE provide grants and loans to incentivise joint procurement, while the defence readiness roadmap 2030 raises the ambition to 40 % joint procurement by 2027. Targeted adjustments to the Defence Procurement Directive aim to reduce administrative barriers and facilitate multinational contracting. Joint procurement offers potential economies of scale, stronger bargaining leverage, greater industrial predictability and enhanced interoperability. Studies indicate that meeting collaborative benchmarks could generate annual savings of several billion euros. Yet significant constraints persist, including differing threat perceptions by national governments, industrial competition that often runs counter to consolidation, governance complexity and risks of cost overruns in multinational programmes. The European Parliament has consistently supported deeper pooling and interoperability, urging collaborative acquisition to be prioritised in EU instruments while cautioning against incentives that may reinforce national disparities. Sustained progress therefore depends on credible demand aggregation, coherent defence planning and effective coordination across EU and NATO frameworks. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

The Statistical Dialogue is a regular exchange between the Director-General of Eurostat and the ECON Committee, enabling its Members to engage on key statistical issues related to EU economic governance. It is based on Regulation (EC) No 223/2009, which enshrines principles of professional independence and accountability, and was reinforced by Regulation (EU) 2015/759, introducing a formal obligation for regular appearances before Parliament. This is the second Statistical Dialogue of the 10th parliamentary term. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

This briefing has been prepared for the public hearing with the Chair of the Single Resolution Board (SRB), Dominique Laboureix, scheduled for 18 March 2026 in the ECON Committee. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

This briefing has been prepared for the public hearing with the Chair of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), Claudia Buch, scheduled for 18 March 2026 in the ECON Committee. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Denmark's national recovery and resilience plan (NRRP) corresponds to 0.2 % of the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), or 0.5 % of Denmark's 2019 gross domestic product (GDP). Spillover gains from other Member States′ plans are expected to more than double the direct impact of the Danish plan. The third and latest revision of the Danish NRRP was approved by the Council on 8 July 2025. The EU financial contribution totals €1 625.9 million, including RRF grants (€1 429 million), a REPowerEU grant (€130.7 million) and a transfer of part of the Danish allocation under the Brexit Adjustment Reserve to the plan (€66.0 million). Denmark has so far received 78 % of the NRRP resources in the form of pre-financing and four payments; this is well above the current EU average (68.6 %). The final payment will depend on full implementation of the plan. Denmark has delivered 75 % of its milestones and targets, against an EU average of 52 %. The amended plan reinforces green initiatives and seeks to enhance the resilience of the Danish economy and society, devoting 69 % of the plan to the green transition (up from 59 % in the original plan). In its 2025 country report, the European Commission assessed the implementation of the Danish plan as 'well under way'. On 2 March 2026, Denmark submitted a request to modify its plan. The European Parliament participates in interinstitutional forums for cooperation and discussion on NRRP implementation and scrutinises the Commission's work. This briefing is one in a series covering all EU Member States. Fifth edition. The 'NGEU delivery' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the lifecycle of the plans. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Europe is one of the world's primary destinations for international migrants. In 2024, the region hosted approximately 94 million migrants, the highest number of any region in the world. The biggest share enter via legal means. The EU is experiencing skills shortages, which is partly because of its ageing population, and migrants could play a role in helping to plug them. The EU shares competence on migration and asylum policies with its Member States; EU legislation plays a significant role in managing legal migration, although its impact varies by type of migration. Nonetheless, data consistently show that most EU legal migration tools are under-used. Blue Cards, an EU initiative to attract highly skilled workers, account for only a fraction of permits issued for employment reasons and few EU countries make significant use of them, which would suggest more work is needed to make them an attractive option. Similarly, the Single Permit, which is a combined work and residency permit, is mostly used by just a handful of EU countries. In recent years, the EU has also launched new initiatives with non-EU countries such as Talent Partnerships and a Talent Pool, but it is too early to say anything about their impact. There is also a directive for seasonal workers, but again only a few EU countries make much use of it. The EU plays an important role when it comes to asylum by setting common standards, clarifying which EU country is responsible for processing an application, and encouraging solidarity. The European Commission has proposed a Return Regulation to make it easer and faster to return non-EU citizens who were unsuccessful in their bid to obtain asylum. It includes the possibility to create return hubs in non-EU countries, which many Member States are interested in. Temporary protection was used for the first time to help Ukrainians after the start of Russia's full-scale invasion in February 2022. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

The impact assessment (IA) identifies four problems relating to slow development and deployment of advanced digital networks in the EU. Relying on the evaluation of the current regulatory framework, the IA discusses the problem drivers, defines specific objectives, and compares and ranks policy options. The objectives are generally well defined. However, the second specific objective refers to closing the high-quality connectivity gap with competing regions without acknowledging that its achievement also depends on developments in those regions. The third specific objective, on increasing pan-European network operation and service provision, is defined in rather generic terms. The policy options seem relevant and sufficiently distinct, although the presentation of the options is not well balanced, with some options discussed in more detail than others. The IA assesses the economic, social and environmental impacts of policy options, although the analysis varies in depth across the problems and options. The costs and benefits for major stakeholders are analysed, including for small and medium-sized enterprises. The preferred options are chosen transparently, and they generally follow the conclusions of the comparative assessments. However, several preferred options could have been justified more effectively. For example, the preferred option for governance has been selected despite ranking second best in the comparison of policy options. Whereas subsidiarity is sufficiently addressed, proportionality is discussed only briefly and selectively. The IA defines a set of indicators and operational objectives to monitor actual impacts. However, some of these indicators are not sufficiently explained, and lack specific targets. The IA makes use of a wealth of data and sources, including feedback from all major stakeholders. The methodology, data and sources are generally explained, although some references are missing or are incomplete. The Regulatory Scrutiny Board (RSB) issued a 'positive with reservations' opinion on the draft IA after initially issuing a negative opinion. The revised draft appears to have addressed the RSB's comments. The proposal appears generally to follow the preferred policy options identified in the IA. One notable addition in the proposal is the creation of a voluntary conciliation mechanism to facilitate dialogue on technical and commercial arrangements, which was not properly addressed in the IA. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

This study provides an overview of the EU policy instruments, including Cohesion Policy Funds, that are used in natural disaster response and recovery. It assesses their contribution to strengthening resilience to climate change and to meeting disaster-relief and reconstruction needs. The study also examines how the ‘Build Back Better’ approach can be integrated into future Cohesion Policy to ensure that disaster-affected areas are rebuilt in a more resilient and sustainable manner. Recommendations are provided on how Cohesion Policy can be improved to support EU regions in responding to disasters. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

On 16 December 2025, the European Commission put forward a proposal for a regulation to simplify the rules governing medical devices in the EU. The proposal forms part of a broader package of measures aimed at improving citizens' health and strengthening the resilience and competitiveness of the health sector. An evaluation of the current EU regulatory framework for medical devices concluded that it has led to unnecessary costs, administrative bottlenecks, regulatory uncertainty for companies, and delays in patient access to medical devices. The proposed revision seeks to address these challenges while ensuring that patient safety remains the highest priority, with faster access to safe and innovative devices. It also aims to reinforce the EU's competitiveness in the medical technology sector, by establishing a more coherent framework enabling companies to better respond to evolving market conditions, technological developments and patient needs. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Since 1 January 2024, the United Kingdom (UK) has been associated to Horizon Europe, with almost 6 000 UK Horizon projects as of 9 January 2026. The legislative proposals for Horizon Europe (2028-2034) and the Euratom training programme (2028-2032) represent a timely opportunity to discuss the future of bilateral EU-UK cooperation in research and innovation, including in the field of nuclear science and technologies. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

This digest provides a collection of documents prepared by the academia, think tanks, other EU institutions and bodies, as well as stakeholders that can be useful for Members of the European Parliament’s Committee on Budgets to stay informed about the debate concerning the next Multiannual Financial Framework, starting in 2028. The document is produced monthly by the Budgetary Support Unit of DG BUDG and the European . Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

The 2027 annual EU budget will be the last one under the current multiannual financial framework (MFF), which covers the period from 2021 to 2027. The European Parliament is contributing to the preparation of next year's budget through a set of guidelines, and the Commission will adopt the draft 2027 budget in early summer. The draft guidelines, as adopted by the Committee on Budgets (BUDG) on 5 March 2026, express Parliament's commitment to deliver for people, the economy and the planet. Parliament is due to vote on its guidelines during its March I plenary session. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

This EPRS paper analyses how the European Commission is delivering on the policy agenda set by its President, Ursula von der Leyen, and her College of Commissioners since taking office in December 2024. It provides an initial assessment of the delivery of the agenda's seven priorities as of spring 2026. The von der Leyen II Commission has set seven priorities – different from the six priorities of her first mandate. It has so far announced close to 400 initiatives. Half of these initiatives fall under the first priority, on prosperity and competitiveness; one in eight under the second, on defence and security; and one in 10 under the third, on social fairness. The remaining initiatives fall under the other four priorities. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

This briefing provides an overview of the economic, financial, and monetary implications of US tariffs for the EU over the past year, as of the cut-off date of 25 February 2026. Given the high level of uncertainty, the analysis presented assumes a continued implementation of the EU-US framework agreement. The briefing and the analysis presented were prepared prior to the recent U.S. and Israeli airstrikes on Iran, and therefore do not take into account any subsequent market volatility or change in the underlying assumptions. This briefing updates a previous one. The first part of the briefing outlines recent developments, including the EU-US trade deal, the 20 February 2026 US Supreme Court ruling on the legality of the imposed tariffs by the US President, and the EU’s countermeasure toolkit. The second part analyses the impact on the EU economy across sectors and Member States, financial markets and monetary policy challenges. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Portugal is set to receive €21.9 billion in grants and loans from the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), the EU response to the crisis triggered by the COVID 19 pandemic. This amount corresponds to 2.9 % of the entire RRF, or 10.2 % of Portugal's 2019 gross domestic product (GDP), and includes RRF grants (€15.5 billion), RRF loans (€5.6 billion), REPowerEU grants (€0.7 billion) and Portugal's share (€0.1 billion) from the Brexit Adjustment Reserve. This is the result of the latest revision of Portugal's national recovery and resilience plan (NRRP), approved in December 2025, which reduced the loan allocation by €0.3 billion. The plan has a strong focus on the country's social, economic and environmental resilience, with measures targeting culture, housing, health, broad social responses, and forest and water management. According to European Commission estimates, Portugal's plan is set to produce direct effects on value added of around €17 billion. Other Member States' NRRPs are expected to add another €2 billion in indirect spillover effects. Measures relating to climate transition, including those on industry decarbonisation and energy efficiency of buildings, account for 37.3 % of the allocation. The contribution to digital objectives represents 22.8 % of the allocation (excluding the REPowerEU chapter), with measures and reforms aimed at public administration and finances, education and businesses. Portugal has so far received €14.9 billion of RRF resources (68.1 % of the plan) in the form of pre-financing and eight grant and loan payments. The total disbursements sit below the EU average of 68.6 %. The European Parliament has been a major supporter of creating a common EU recovery instrument, and takes part in interinstitutional settings to cooperate, discuss and scrutinise implementation of the Commission's work. This briefing is one in a series covering all EU Member States. Fifth edition. The first two editions were written by Henrique Morgado Simões. The 'NGEU delivery' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the lifecycle of the plans. The author would like to thank Ana Luisa Melo Almeida, policy analyst in the Next Generation EU Monitoring Service, for her research assistance. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

The EU has made closing the gender gap in science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) a priority in its education, research and employment policies. This answers to legal requirements to pursue gender equality through any EU action, as well as to practical imperatives to address a shortage of specialists that limits the EU's ability to compete in the global technological race. Moreover, existing data show that many young women today have strong maths and science skills but are still largely absent from careers in engineering and information and communications technology (ICT). Research shows that the under-representation of women in STEM has many causes, including: unwelcoming work environments in STEM jobs, family caring responsibilities, and social norms that discourage girls from pursuing these fields. Tackling these issues requires a combined approach including: challenging rigid gender stereotypes, using gender-sensitive teaching methods in schools, encouraging girls to choose STEM careers, and removing barriers to employment. The EU pursues gender equality as a cross-cutting priority in various policies that cover STEM, and has adopted specific initiatives to promote women in STEM. In education, it uses a range of measures to support women at all levels, from schools to universities. In research, EU funding now depends on programmes promoting gender equality. In employment, EU laws help remove obstacles that might put women off STEM careers. The EU also funds projects that support women's innovation, entrepreneurship, networking and mentoring. The European Parliament strongly backs these efforts, and has called for wider action by the EU and its Member States. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

New digital technologies are a mixed blessing for women's rights and representation in the information sphere in general, and in the democratic debate in particular. Innovative digital tools often promise to make public debates more inclusive, for women too. In practice, recent AI-enabled technology – including deepfake tools – appears to facilitate an increasingly hostile information environment for women, with repercussions for their democratic participation both online and offline. At the same time, the ongoing global wave of autocratisation goes hand in hand with a backlash against women's rights and gender equality. Authoritarian regimes have strategic reasons for suppressing women, and often use gendered disinformation to undermine women opposition leaders, as well as to erode confidence in democratic values and rights. In the European Union, equality between men and women is a fundamental right and a founding value enshrined in the Treaties. Over the past decades, the EU has worked to increase gender equality at home, and used its global influence to support women's rights abroad. At the same time, its evolving digital regulatory framework aims to make the digital space safe for all, including by protecting the rights of women online. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP